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Global conservation priorities have often been identified based on the combination of species rich-
ness and threat information. With the development of the field of systematic conservation planning,
more attention has been given to conservation costs. This leads to prioritizing developing countries,
where costs are generally low and biodiversity is high. But many of these countries have poor gover-
nance, which may result in ineffective conservation or in larger costs than initially expected.
We explore how the consideration of governance affects the selection of global conservation priori-
ties for the world’s mammals in a complementarity-based conservation prioritization. We use data
on Control of Corruption (Worldwide Governance Indicators project) as an indicator of governance
effectiveness, and gross domestic product per capita as an indicator of cost. We show that, while
core areas with high levels of endemism are always selected as important regardless of governance
and cost values, there are clear regional differences in selected sites when biodiversity, cost or
governance are taken into account separately. Overall, the analysis supports the concentration of
conservation efforts in most of the regions generally considered of high priority, but stresses the
need for different conservation approaches in different continents owing to spatial patterns of
governance and economic development.
Keywords: spatial conservation prioritization; mammals; good governance; corruption;
conservation effectiveness1. INTRODUCTION
Nearly one quarter of mammal species are globally
threatened or already extinct [1]. Despite major conser-
vation efforts, mammals continue to decline, and at
faster rates than birds, with threats such as habitat loss
and hunting being still ineffectively addressed [2].
During the last 500 years, 76 mammal species have
been lost, and the rate is accelerating [1].These numbers
call for additional conservation efforts and careful
identification of priorities.
Global conservation priorities have typically been
identified based on information on species richness,
endemism and areas under most threat [3–5]. These
‘hotspot’ priorities have been criticized by the rising
field of systematic conservation planning [6], whichr for correspondence (cabeza@cc.helsinki.fi).
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2661addresses resource allocation problems with quantita-
tive objectives through optimization techniques. Such
an approach is customizable to include a number of rel-
evant factors. Mammals, in particular, have been the
target of several applications of this type, accounting for
conservation costs [7], humanpressure [8], latent extinc-
tion risk [9] and opportunity costs to limit conflicts
between conservation and agricultural activity [10].
The field of systematic conservation planning has
brought along a strong focus on the need to account for
economic costs in the conservation planning process.
This is necessary in a world of limited resources, but
comes with its own problems (see [11] for a more com-
prehensive discussion on the topic). At global scales,
when costs are considered, developing countries tend
to be prioritized as they offer high biological diversity
with potentially low land acquisition and management
costs [12]. However, socio-political differences between
countries are arguably no smaller or less important
than the economical ones. It has indeed been shown
that conservation outcomes correlatewith socio-political
factors [13,14], with low values for socio-politicalThis journal is q 2011 The Royal Society
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tion outcomes. For example, the numbers of African
Elephants and Black Rhinos could be explained by cor-
responding national values of a corruption indicator
[15] and additional correlative relationships supporting
this fact have been found for the ProtectedAreaManage-
ment Effectiveness Index and the Human Development
Index [16], and tropical protected area effectiveness and
corruption levels [17].
Many countries with high species richness and ende-
mism could offer low costs for conservation, but also
suffer from inefficient governance, political instability
and higher levels of corruption [13]. Thus, while the
benefit-to-cost ratio of conservation may be apparently
greater in developing regions of the world because of
their lower costs for land acquisition and management,
it is often exactly in these countries that the lack of good
governance impeding effective conservation ismost acute.
To date, governance has rarely been accounted for in
conservation planning approaches (but see [14] and
[18]). However, governance should not be disregarded,
even though we lack decent models on how corruption
impacts on conservation success and the relationship
between the two still is rather unexplored [19,20]. The
problem is the lack of empirical data to explore this
relationship which could then be used in quantitative
prioritizations either by penalizing the effectiveness of
conservation actions or by increasing the costs for carry-
ing themout.Despite the lackof quantitativemeasures to
account for this socio-political dimension, many still
acknowledge the importance of it [8,10,21,22].
The aim of this study is to compare mammal conser-
vation priorities in relation to governance and economic
indicators. The availability of recently completed habitat
suitabilitymodels for terrestrialmammals [23] allows for
the exploration of this on a global scale but with fine res-
olutiondata.The global focus allowsus to explore the full
variation in costs for conservation and governance. We
applied a systematic conservation planning approach
aimed at prioritizing important mammal conservation
regions, while accounting for mammal diversity only,
mammaldiversity conditional to costs,mammaldiversity
penalized by governance and various combinations of
these. Here, we assume that corruption has a negative
impact on conservation effectiveness, but see §4 for
alternative hypotheses. Our study allows the exploration
of trade-offs between these factors and it also generates
balanced solutions that consider biodiversity together
with economical costs and quality of governance. But
first and foremost, it contributes to the debate on the
importance of considering governance issues when
aiming at effective conservation planning.2. MATERIAL AND METHODS
(a) Mammal species distribution data
Distribution data for the world’s terrestrial mammals
come from habitat suitability models [23]. This high
resolution dataset contains the modelled distributions
of 5086 mammal species, and is based on the global
mammal assessment led by the International Union
for Conservation of Nature [1]. The data were used
at a resolution of 0.18 and this resulted in 3600 
1800 grid cells.Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2011)(b) Cost data
Unlike Bode et al. [22] and Wilson et al. [18], we chose
not to use the cost model derived in Balmford et al.
[12] to estimate conservation costs at national level,
because it reflects differences in the types of conserva-
tion projects that have been so far funded in different
nations—wealthy nations engaging in more costly con-
servation actions (restoration, etc.) than the poor ones.
Indeed, it results in a variation of seven orders of
magnitude in costs between countries. Instead, as in
other prioritization approaches [24], we use a more
general indicator of cost, gross domestic product
(GDP) per capita, which has a variation of ca three
orders of magnitude. We used the nominal GDP per
capita instead of GDP at Purchasing Power Parity,
because global conservation prioritizations are likely
to be relevant for international non-governmental
organizations or donor investments from industrialized
countries [25], and thus investments must be made
using market exchange rates. Economic and population
datawere obtained from theWorldDevelopmentReport
2009 [26], and used to calculate GDP (nominal) per
capita. This information was available for 182 countries.(c) Governance data
Themost comprehensive and publicly availablemeasure
of governance is the Worldwide Governance Indicators
(WGI) project [27], which incorporates many of the
other available assessments ongovernance (International
Country Risk Guide, Freedom House, Country Policy
and Institutional Assessment, and most of the sources
also used by Transparency International in forming
their composite indicator). These data are available for
a larger set of countries and territories than individual
indexes used previously in conservation studies (e.g.
[15]). TheWGI-dataset includes data on six dimensions
of governance (voice and accountability, political stab-
ility and absence of violence/terrorism, government
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control
of corruption) for 212 countries and territories over the
period 1996–2007. These aggregated indicators are
based on several hundred individual variables quantify-
ing perceptions of governance, drawn from separate
data sources constructed by different non-governmental
organizations, private–public agencies and individuals
(such as Afrobarometro, World Economic Forum,
Gallup World Poll and Reporters without Borders).
The aggregated indicators are weighted averages of the
underlying data. The dataset has been used in some con-
servation studies [24,28], showing a strong positive
correlation between national governance quality scores
and GDP per capita, implying that many developing
countries suffer from poor governance. All six govern-
ance factors are strongly correlated [24,28]. We chose
to use a single factor, control of corruption, as corruption
has been shown to be related to conservation out-
comes [15] and also to influence the effectiveness of
development aid [29].(d) Prioritization with ZONATION
Global mammal priorities were identified with the con-
servation planning software ZONATION [30,31]. The
runs were performed with ZONATION 3 development
Governance in conservation planning J. Eklund et al. 2663version, which is to be publicly released in 2011.
ZONATION produces a hierarchical prioritization of
the landscape based on the biological value of sites,
accounting for complementarity. The algorithm pro-
ceeds by removing the least valuable cell from the
landscape, minimizing marginal loss of conservation
value.
We used a variant of ZONATION (Basic core-area
ZONATION) that encourages the representation of all
species. The local biodiversity value of a cell is based
on the species that has the highest proportion of its distri-
bution remaining in the specific cell. In other words, the
algorithm removes first cells with species that have wide
distributions, and aims at retaining equal amounts of
habitat for all species. When a cost layer (in this study,
consisting of GDP and/or corruption scores—see
below) is used, cell removal is based on local biodiversity
value divided by cell cost. The Core-Area ZONATION
resembles the ‘gain metric’ of Wilson et al. [18] in that
a species’ distribution in a cell is valued relative to its
total distribution, but with two main differences: (i) as
cells are progressively removed, the importance of the
occurrences of initially widely distributed species
increases, and (ii) it produces a continuous ranking of
the whole landscape, instead of using fixed targets for
species representation or constraints for resource use.
Countries lacking the socio-political and economic
data were masked out of the analysis, resulting in
179 countries used in our analyses (see electronic sup-
plementary material, table S1 for the list of countries).
Most of the excluded countries were small and unlikely
to influence the general patterns in the results, but the
absence of countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq and
Somalia should be noted when interpreting the results.
Species endemic to these countries were thus not
included in the analysis, which meant having 5016
species in our results instead of the 5086 in the full
dataset.
Data are not available for linking governance scores to
effectiveness of mammal conservation, or to realized
costs via empirically derived functions. In the absence
of such models, we chose to incorporate governance
scores in our objective function as increased costs,
based on the assumption that in countries where the
level of corruption is high only part of the resources will
end up beingused for the intendedpurpose.We explored
how relative differences in cost and governance variables
influence global conservation priorities. We re-scaled
both variables to vary between 0 and 100. Eight different
conservation scenarios were produced, one by letting
only the biodiversity data drive the selection (referred
to as the Biodiversity-only scenario, technically corre-
sponding to cost layer values being equal everywhere),
and seven scenarios by weighting and combining differ-
ently GDP and corruption data into a cost layer. We
consider two extreme scenarios (Economic cost scenario
and Governance scenario) by giving the maximum
weight of 1 to one of the variables, and the minimum
weight of 0 to the other. The equal weighting of econ-
omic costs and governance was also considered (giving
0.5 weights to both) and various weightings between
these values (0.1, 0.25, 0.75, 0.9), always summing up
to one (e.g. weight of 0.1 for governance, weight of 0.9
for economic cost). A final cost index was calculated asPhil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2011)a combination of the two by a simple additive approach:
subject to Ci ¼ ECi  wEC þGi  wG
wEC þWG ¼ 1;
whereCi is the total cost considered for the grid cell i,ECi
is the economic cost class of cell i (based on GDP per
capita), Gi is the governance cost class, and wEC and
wG are weights given to the economic cost or the govern-
ance classes, respectively, as explained above. These
different weighting schemes gave each country different
cost-corruption indexes that were used as cost layers in
the ZONATION runs.3. RESULTS
A comparison of the most extreme scenarios (Biodiver-
sity-only, Economic cost and Governance scenarios)
showed important continental differences in priorities
(figure 1a and table 1; see also electronic supplementary
material, table S1 for detailed results): Africa included
many areas that stood out as priorities when economic
costs were considered, but not when only biodiversity
was accounted for (in blue). In South America, several
priorities represented important areas for biodiversity,
but higher costs combined with poor governance
prevented them from being prioritized in the other scen-
arios (yellow).But variation inboth costs andgovernance
were large in South America, which showed in the pri-
ority map as higher variation in the colour patterns.
Regions in the Northern Hemisphere and Australia
stood out as important biodiversity areas with good gov-
ernance (orange), but high costs prevented these regions
from being selected when GDP per capita was con-
sidered. With highest penalties to poor governance
some well-governed but expensive and partly less biodi-
verse areas e.g. in Australia and the Boreal region
gained more emphasis (red).
If we focus on the top 10 per cent priorities in each
scenario, the area that overlapped in all eight scenarios
is small, covering only 5.68 per cent of the total land
area. Common priorities, characterized by countries
or regions with high endemism, were particularly
common in Africa (overlap between the three extreme
scenarios is shown in black in figure 1a). Coincidence
was lowest between prioritizations done with the Gov-
ernance versus the Economic cost scenario (black þ
purple in figure 1a), as would be expected given the
correlation between GDP per capita and Control of
Corruption (Kendall’s tau 0.557, p , 0.001). Particu-
larly, parts of Africa, and Southeast Asia showed larger
proportions of low cost areas important for biodiver-
sity but which are poorly governed (green in figure 1a).
When looking further than the top 10 per cent frac-
tion, across all scenarios, a larger number of nations
became important. figure 1b shows summed ranks
across all scenarios, illustrating areas that were important
with higher certainty no matter how costs and govern-
ance were considered (in red), and areas that were least
valuable (in darkblue).Note that areaswith intermediate
summed rank values could either denote regions more
sensitive to assumptions about influence of governance
or cost (i.e. more variation between the different
scenarios), or areas of consistently intermediate priority.
biodiversity
governance
cost
biodiversity and 
governance
biodiversity and cost
governance and cost
biodiversity and governance 
and cost
(a)
summed rank
value
high: 7 .99882
low: 0 .0003998
(b)
Figure 1. Spatial distribution of conservation priority areas selected in a complementarity analysis with different scenarios.
(a) Top 10% priorities from the three most extreme scenarios: biodiversity only (yellow), costs only (blue) and governance
only (red). Areas of overlap, between combinations of the scenarios are also shown: biodiversity þ governance (orange); bio-
diversity and GDP (green); GDP and governance (purple). Areas identified as top 10% priorities across all three scenarios are
shown in black. (b) Sum of ranks across all eight scenarios. Dark red indicates higher priorities across all scenarios, dark blue
low priority across all scenarios. Intermediate colours indicate either intermediate importance or variable importance.
2664 J. Eklund et al. Governance in conservation planningCorrelation of cell ranks between different solutions
were in accordance with the results in figure 1a (elec-
tronic supplementary material, table S2). They were
very high between the closest scenario variants (e.g.
the 0.1 weighting versus Governance scenarios isPhil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2011)0.994, p, 1215) and lowest between the Economic
cost and Governance scenarios (0.587, p , 1215).
Each scenario aimed atmaximizing a particular objec-
tive, which included only biodiversity, or a combination
of biodiversity and cost–governance constraints. The
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Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2011)strongest penalties for governance resulted inmore costly
solutions, measured as the mean GDP per capita of
selected units, but in the scenarios with intermediate
weightings for cost and governance the overall cost of
the solution was low (figure 2a), and similar to the cost
of the solution when using biodiversity only. Solutions
based on scenarios where GDP per capita has a high con-
tribution resulted in the largest overall corruption level
within the top priorities. These levels of corruption
were much higher than the average corruption level
across all nations (figure 2b).Those scenarios accounting
for governance in the planning achieved substantial
reductions in overall corruption levels. In turn, the inter-
mediate Economic cost–Governance scenarios (0.5
weighting) had a cost distribution similar to the biodiver-
sity-only solution, and provided an improvement in
corruption levels compared with the biodiversity-only
solution without incurring much increase in GDP
per capita values.
Therewere small differences in the protection levels of
species across scenarios (figure 3a,b). In terms of average
proportion of the distribution protected, the GDP per
capita-constrained solution achieved smallest overall cov-
erage of species distributions, while the most extreme
governance penalty resulted in intermediate levels. The
intermediateEconomic cost–Governance scenarios per-
formed very similarly to the biodiversity-only solution.
Nonetheless, all solutions achieved coverage of all species
when 5 per cent or more of the world’ terrestrial surface
was protected (figure 3b).TheBiodiversity-only scenario
retained species furthest, as the fraction of protected
area decreased, with most other scenarios achieving
very similar results. Only theGDP per capita-constrained
solution differed notably from other schemes, starting to
lose species coverage at larger fractions of area protected
(figure 3b).4. DISCUSSION
We have shown that there are important trade-offs
between governance and cost, and that taking govern-
ance into account in the planning of conservation
priorities, albeit simplistically, can make a large differ-
ence. Interestingly, we have shown that these trade-offs
vary in space, some continents being more affected
than others. Despite this, some regions are identified
as priorities with any of the scenarios and thus we
urge conservation efforts in these areas. We do not rec-
ommend neglecting poorly governed nations, and
want to stress that different conservation approaches
are needed in different regions.
Our intermediate Economic cost–Governance
scenarios seem to provide desirable levels of govern-
ance with only a minor increase in cost, and are thus
solutions that should be preferred. It is noteworthy
that much more of the area important for biodiversity
overlaps with the governance-based priorities than
with the cost-based (more orange than green in
figure 1a). Instead, cost-based priorities include
much area that would not be prioritized in any other
scenario. This illustrates the risks of focusing largely
on economic costs [11], with funds being diverted
from the most important biodiversity regions to areas
where they might end up in the wrong hands, or
GDP per capita
0 20 40 60 80 100
corruption
0 20 40 60 80 100
econ
gov
biodiv
econ
(a)
(b)
econ 0.9–gov 0.1
econ 0.75–gov 0.25
econ 0.5–gov 0.5
econ 0.25–gov 0.75
econ 0.1–gov 0.9
econ 0.9–gov 0.1
econ 0.75–gov 0.25
econ 0.5–gov 0.5
econ 0.25–gov 0.75
econ 0.1–gov 0.9
gov
biodiv
115 99 87920 068 40 020 59 973 79 926
2.60 1.81 1.01 0.22 –0.57 –1.37
Figure 2. Distribution of GDP values (a) and governance scores (b) for all cells in top 10% fractions achieved with each of the
eight scenarios. Mean and 95th percentiles across all nations in the dataset are shown as reference (solid line and dashed line,
respectively). The units on x-axes are given both as the scaled values used in our calculations (below) and as the original GDP
and Control of Corruption indicator values (above the panels).
2666 J. Eklund et al. Governance in conservation planninganyhow used ineffectively. Incorporating costs into the
prioritization process can be misleading if other socio-
political constraints are not considered as well.
Important areas identified by other mammal
conservation prioritization approaches also maintain
high priority in our analysis (e.g. [8,10], see also simi-
larities with Wilson et al. [18]). Our highest priority
regions contain areas that despite poor governance
are necessary to achieve global mammal conservation
because of their high levels of endemism, e.g. the
Andes, Mexico, Western Ghats, Madagascar, Papua
New Guinea, Indonesia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, etc.
Hotspot regions such as Japan, California and the
Mediterranean basin are high priorities for biodiversity
and also well-governed, but high costs would prevent
them from being prioritized in a cost-based analysis.
The top 10 per cent of the priorities identified by the
Biodiversity-only, Economic cost and Governance scen-
arios overlapped by 40, 42 and 32 per cent, respectively,
with the Biodiversity Hotspots [4].
We chose to incorporate governance in our prioritiza-
tion as an additional cost. This is based on thePhil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2011)perception that the apparent low costs of conservation
in corrupt countries are not real: only a fraction of the
invested conservation funds will be spent effectively on
the intended purpose. Thus, to achieve the proposed
goals, additional investments should be made, resulting
in increased conservation costs. This is likely to be true,
but not the whole truth. In poorly governed countries,
even the conservation actions that end up being
implemented may not be effective owing to poaching
and other illegal activities, and corruption can act as
an incentive for overexploitation of resources. So no
matter how much economic resource is spent, the out-
comes may remain unsatisfactory. An alternative (but
technically largely equivalent) conservation prioritiza-
tion approach would instead penalize the conservation
outcomes based on quality of governance (i.e. assume
that only a fraction of the biodiversity features can be
protected effectively if the level of corruption is high).
Wilson et al. [18] used a factor for ‘investment success’
derived from data on government ineffectiveness. But
no matter which approach is chosen, empirical data to
link effectiveness to such indicators (added cost, or
landscape protected (%)
n
o
. 
sp
ec
ie
s u
nr
ep
re
se
nt
ed
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
012345
landscape protected (%)
fra
ct
io
n 
of
 sp
ec
ie
s d
ist
rib
ut
io
ns
 re
pr
es
en
te
d
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0(a)
(b)
020406080
0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0
100
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
29 27 25 23 21
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Governance in conservation planning J. Eklund et al. 2667effective conservation outcomes) are still required to
achieve more reliable results.
On the other hand, our results showed dramatic
impact of corruption penalties to spatial priorities, con-
trasting with the findings of Wilson et al. [18]. These
differences can arise for at least two reasons: (i) a
larger variation in cost data used by Wilson et al. [18]
resulted in stronger influence of cost with respect to
other factors, and (ii) the temporal variability in in-
vestment effectiveness considered by Wilson et al.’s
dynamic approach, where investments made in periods
of government ineffectiveness were considered to fail,
and others to succeed despite following periods of
ineffectiveness.Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2011)Corruption, and its influence on effectiveness of con-
servation programmes, has been identified as one of
the ‘One hundred questions of importance to the
conservation of global biological diversity’ [32]. If the
assumptions about the positive relationship between
good governance and conservation effectiveness hold,
low cost solutions will not necessarily lead to effective
use of resources: many of the countries that offer low
cost investments for conservation actions are also
the ones that suffer most from corruption. Yet, little
effort has gone to date into considering governance in
evaluating global conservation priorities.
A better understanding of the relationship between
governance and conservation outputs, and governance
2668 J. Eklund et al. Governance in conservation planningand effective conservation costs will eventually allow for
a better parametrization of the conservation approach
presented here. Nevertheless, in the meantime lessons
can perhaps be learnt from the field of aid effectiveness,
where the discussion on how to account for governance
factors has received major attention in the recent past.
Studies have shown that aid will only lead to develop-
ment (which should be considered the main aim of
development assistance) in better governed countries
[33–35]. That is, aid effectiveness seems to be con-
ditional on the quality of institutions and policies.
Better governed countries can use aid money more
effectively, and therefore achieve expected development
outcomes. These findings, still debated [36,37], have
led to questions of selectivity versus conditionality
[38,39]: should aid be given based on certain policy
conditions (ex ante), or should it only be given to
where it is likely to succeed (ex post)? These ideas may
not apply directly to conservation, but there are clear
analogies: should conservation investments be directed
to regions with favourable conservation conditions, or
should biodiversity needs drive conservation priorities
but effectiveness be enhanced in problematic regions
in different ways?
Corruption can have complex, both positive and
negative, effects on biodiversity and these effects are
likely to be different at different scales. Possible positive
effects could be that a corrupt government is less likely to
invest in infrastructure development in rural areas that
would affect biodiversity negatively [20]. Corrupt
countries experience inefficient economies and are less
likely to attract foreign direct investments by multi-
national corporations and industries to exploit their
natural resources [20]. But wealthy nations do tend to
displace the exploitative industries to poor countries,
which might mean that the poor but less corrupt
countries could face higher threats from industrial
activities. On the other hand, slow economic growth is
likely to affect local peoples’ livelihoods negatively and
this might again increase overexploitation on a local
scale. We have ignored the potential positive effects of
poor governance in this study, but our conservation
planning framework could account both for positive
and negative effects, once the relationship between
governance and conservation effectiveness is better
understood.
To conclude, we do not suggest that allocation of
conservation resources should follow the priority maps
produced in our analyses, although they may give
some indication of regions that may deserve further con-
siderations before large conservation investments
are made. We warn about the use of economic costs in
conservation prioritization exercises, when this is
detached from other socio-economic factors, as this
may result in resources being poured into either regions
less important for biodiversity or ineffective projects.
Rather thanneglectingpoorly governednations,ourfind-
ings stress the need for developing and applying different
conservation approaches in different regions [40]. We
need to find less costly ways of working in the expensive
and well-governed regions (e.g. North America, Austra-
lia), perhaps building on volunteer-based conservation
programmes, or comprehensive land use planning
approaches. Low cost and well-governed regions mayPhil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2011)be most suitable targets for the traditional external
conservation investments. Valuable areas suffering from
poor governance (e.g. Sub-Saharan Africa, Papua New
Guinea), must not be abandoned, especially, as many
of these areas also face the highest predicted loss of suit-
able habitat for mammals in the future [41]. Africa, in
particular, with its high mammal diversity and high
predicted future threats in addition to high levels of
corruption, presents a specific challenge to the conserva-
tion community. Conservation projects might usefully
focus on conservation education and engagement of
local people, through setting up social-learning insti-
tutions [42], with the aim of changing things from
within the society. Finally, we want to stress the need
for furthering the mechanistic understanding of the
effects of governance on conservation effectiveness.
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